On Augustine’s Confessions: his early encounters with Ambrose

As Augustine moves closer to submission under biblical authority, which is accomplished in the Milanese garden at the end of Book VII, it has already been noted that a certain “wager” in the midst of his suspicions put him in a place to receive catholic teachings about and from the Bible before the garden scene. An important detail in Augustine’s wager was skipped over, and must be revisited.

Before the wager could have happened, Augustine had to be given the smallest glimmer of hope with regard to the Bible. Even though something may promise infinite gain for the gambler, if there is no likelihood of achieving it, then there is no wager: if the Bible were to have no possible refutation for the Manichæan attacks, then the Bible and the Church that teaches from it are not at all an option. But in Book V, Chapters xiii-xiv, just before Augustine becomes a catechumen, he takes the words of Ambrose to heart. Ambrose’s influence on Augustine’s thinking, especially with respect to the Old Testament, cannot be passed over.

In brief, Augustine listens to Ambrose only because the latter is a renowned rhetorician. He wishes to hear how well Ambrose speaks, and does not care of what. But in the listening, what is said eventually takes hold of Augustine and infiltrates some of the Manichæan strongholds, undermining their attack on the Old Testament’s validity.

This brings up the earlier consideration of style and content in the episode about Cicero’s Hortensius. Just as in the reading of that book, here with Ambrose he approaches him desiring to get some great rhetorical training; and just as with that book, the content of some of the words slips in. He weighs the words carefully, and finds Ambrose to be worthy of his fame. And despite trying to keep his mind off the content, he is able to note the effect of Ambrose’s message, at least in retrospect:

And verily with the sweetness of his discourse I was much delighted: which, however it were more learned, yet was it not so pleasing and inveigling as Faustus his was, the manner of the oratory I mean, though for the matter there was no comparison. For Faustus did but rove up and down amongst his Manichæan fallacies; but Ambrose taught salvation most soundly. But salvation is far enough from sinners, such as I was at that instant; and yet I drew little and little nearer toward it; but how, I knew not.

At least twice before—the reading of the Hortensius and the refutation of Faustus—has a great rhetorician changed Augustine’s mind, he being quite unable to explain how. The Hortensius gives him beautiful words and yet dissuades him from the career path of a lawyer, in which Augustine has been planning to put such words to money-winning use. Next Faustus gives him beautiful words and yet simultaneously shows the inadequacy of Manichæan thought behind the words. And here again Ambrose gives him beautiful words whose effect on him is unanticipated.

In a previous post the effect of these words was described as the deciding factor in the wager to become a catechumen. What is of interest here is the role Ambrose the human teacher has in relation to the Old Testament, which consists of supposedly “God-breathed” words, as at 2 Timothy 3.16, whose authority is the question of most of the Confessions. Of Ambrose there is no question that Augustine thinks of him as an angel of God: “To him was I led by thee, unknowing, that by him I might be brought to thee, knowing it.” According to God’s own plan, it seems, Ambrose is a necessary part of Augustine’s journey. He is responsible for changing Augustine’s views of the Old Testament, at least just enough to expose him to the remainder of biblical doctrines and allow for a non-literal hermeneutic. The Bible, though, apart from Ambrose, would have forever been subject to the abuses of the Manichæan interpretations and dismissals. It, being in need of interpretation at all, was unable to defend itself in the world. So we return to the point brought out in Plato’s Phædrus about writing.

With this instance, it seems that the Bible is need of defending. It seems that even it, as a text, is not exempt from the dangers associated with writing. Does Augustine also think of it as merely an excellent specimen among the infinitude of books?

On Plato’s Phædrus: two kinds of writing and questions about Augustine’s treatment of the Bible in this scheme

Note: I have come to reconsider the content in this article, and it will be re-posted at a later date.  I particularly disagree with my reading of the “image” at the end, and will soon be adjusting my interpretation accordingly.

At the end of Plato’s Phædrus, 274C-275B,* Socrates relates a myth, supposedly Egyptian, of the god Theuth speaking to the king-god Thamus about the arts he wishes to give to humankind. Of Theuth’s greatest gifts is writing. He tells the king that writing will be the drug that augments memory and wisdom. Thamus, however, disagrees, saying instead that it will “create forgetfulness in the learners’ souls” by keeping them from the habitude of recollection and the exercise of memory. Written words remind the learners, but have nothing to do with aiding memory. The distinction is important. For Plato, as described in the Meno, what people call learning is nothing but the soul’s recollection of knowledge it had possessed before its current bodily indwelling. To exercise the memory, then, directly enhances the capability of learning, because it works the same intellectual muscles required to dig up eternal things forgotten in the soul. But to be reminded of something has nothing to do with learning, and it presupposes that the one reminded has already learned, already recollected, the eternal knowledge from within the soul; having what the writer has learned external to him gives him the freedom to no longer practice searching it out within himself, and so he gets out of the habit of searching his soul altogether, thereby reducing his capacity for learning. The distinction between the aid to memory and the reminder might be carried further in the following analogy: the aid to memory is to the reminder as a question is to a dogma, and as a living interlocutor is to a dead book. The antecedents are all stimuli for learning, whereas the consequents are only crutches by which one ceases to think and rests in the ease of merely repeating old knowledge.

Plato through Socrates through Thamus goes on to speak even more disparagingly of writing: “You give your disciples not truth, but only the semblance of truth; they will be hearers of many things and will have learned nothing; they will appear to be omniscient and will generally not know anything; they will be tiresome company, having the show of wisdom without the reality.” Now a nuance is taken into consideration. Above, it was made clear that writing would help someone who had knowledge to keep his knowledge nearby, while atrophying his faculties of recollection. But here, what is at issue is the effect of the writing on those who have not written it, the effect of knowledge that is given from outside and not sought and found within the learner. The conclusion seems to be that the student of the dead book may at best be a parrot for another man’s knowledge, but he himself does not thereby know. The reminders in writing can never be clear or certain for those who have not written them, that is, for those who have not known the things before reading them. This will all take a twist of meaning when it is brought back to Augustine’s thoughts about the Holy Spirit, but Plato has more to say about writing that will aid the inquiry.

Socrates, at 275D-E,* notes that, no matter how lifelike a painting might seem, the painting does not respond to the looker. A piece of writing is exactly like this painting, having the semblance of understanding, but not having life. If the reader asks the words a question, they only give one answer, they only repeat themselves. They cannot read between their own lines, and they cannot explain themselves. They also cannot discriminate: “when they have been once written down they are tumbled about anywhere among those who may or may not understand them, and know not to whom they should reply, to whom not.” As was pointed out above, writing will give the semblance of knowledge for those who are reminded of something they themselves have not yet learned. It would be better if the words could choose to whom they reveal their meaning and to whom not, acting as reminders to those who have knowledge, and being inaccessible to those who have no business reading them. But as it is, they are perpetual victims, susceptible to violence at all times. They are like illegitimate children, always needing the help of their father the writer to come to their defense. Should he stop defending them, there is nothing to protect them from misuse or abuse.

Shall we conclude that writing is always in some way harmful and always being harmed whenever it is read? Socrates and Phædrus, at 276A, consider another kind of writing that stands in stark opposition to what has already been said, and this second kind will give us substantial questions for comparison between Plato’s view of writing and Augustine’s view of the Bible. This second kind is like the legitimate son from the same father as the other. It is legitimate because it was written according to knowledge in the writer’s soul. Being so, it does not need its father’s protection, but is brought up able to defend itself, discriminating between those to whom it speaks. Phædrus muses that such a speech coming from knowledge is living and ensouled, and that the written form of it is an “image” proper. A careful distinction must be made here: this image is not the same as the mute painting or the dead book mentioned above. It does not enter the soul as a mere appearance, as a shell of something, but as a shell carries with it the substance of the thing imaged. It is like a seed, and hence Socrates goes on to describe the responsible and knowledgeable writer as a serious farmer, 276A-277A.

More of the Phædrus will inform some later inquiries, but what has been brought up so far can be brought back to the Confessions in a series of questions. Augustine tells us much of his early education and his experience with particular books. Some of them he remembers with reverence, like Cicero’s Hortensius, and others he scorns as distractions from God’s call to repentance, like Virgil’s Æneid. But over and above them all Augustine puts the Bible, and of especial interest in his debate with the Manichæans are Genesis and the Old Testament.  Does Augustine draw the same distinction as the Phædrus between the dead books and the living? Is it as simple as saying the world’s books are illegitimate sons, and the Bible legitimate? Are the former mute like a painting, but the latter able to impregnate the reader with knowledge? The Bible’s relationship to the dichotomy brought up by Plato will be very insightful, leading directly into a rich understanding of Augustine’s thoughts on Moses, the Holy Spirit, and the role of reading for Christians, which will come up in a few of the following articles.

*All Phædrus citations come from Jowett’s public domain translation.

On Augustine’s Confessions: hermeneutics with love

In Book XII of the Confessions, Augustine acknowledges the large variety of interpretations that arise from the first few sentences of Genesis. In the midst of discussing these, he takes a whole chapter, xxv, to propose a fundamental rule for Bible teachers: in no way should they compromise love in discussions about the meaning of the written word.

Behold now, how foolish a conceit it is, in such plenty of most true opinions, as may be fetched out of those same words, rashly to affirm which of them Moses principally meant: and thereby, with pernicious contentions to offend charity itself; for whose sake he spake everything, whose words we go about to expound.

When I first read this I found it a little surprising. Augustine himself had some very strong opinions about Genesis, for the most part supporting an allegorical hermeneutic for the whole creation story. This kind of interpretation he thought was instrumental in combating some, like the Manichæans, who used peculiar literal readings of passages in Genesis as a means to discredit the Old Testament, to maintain that its putative contradictions render it useless for any instruction. So it is conceivable that, because of his success in combating the Manichæans, he would have highly valued his own opinions. Augustine, however, appears very sensitive to the verse, “God opposes the proud, but gives grace to the humble,”* from James 4.6, 1 Peter 5.5, Proverbs 3.34 Septuagint. This he cites in the second sentence of Book I, and then he repeats it many times throughout the whole. He acknowledges his own great intelligence and skill as a writer, but he fears the fruit of these excellences if his pride should get hold of them. So he would rather be contradicted than stand firm in his conceit. To this point he writes about the proud who love their own opinions and assert them too strongly:

Whereas they are so earnest, that Moses did not mean what I say, but what they say; this I neither like nor love: for even if it is so, yet is this rashness of theirs no sign of knowledge, but of over boldness; nor hath seeing further, but swelling bigger, begotten it. And therefore, O Lord, are thy judgments to be trembled at; seeing that thy truth is neither mine, nor his, nor a third’s; but belonging to us all, whom thou callest publicly to partake of it: warning us terribly not to account it private to ourselves, for fear we be deprived of it. For whosoever challenges that as proper to himself, which thou propoundest for all to enjoy, and would make that his own, which belongs to all; that man shall be driven from what is common to all, to what is properly his own; that is, from truth, to a lie. For he that speaketh a lie, speaketh it of his own.

That last sentence, qui enim loquitur mendacium de suo loquitur, is a fairly literal translation of the Greek, ὅταν λαλῇ τὸ ψεῦδος ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων λαλεῖ, of Joh. 8.44, which is in reference to the devil, who is often associated with pride and prideful men, as at III.vi and X.xliii. Augustine believes that human conceit runs together inextricably with the devil’s deceit. On this premise alone we could consider the healthy fear of our own pride justified. But Augustine’s main point, getting back to that rule for Bible teachers mentioned above, is that pride leads to discord and upsets love. If we believe what Jesus Christ said about the two greatest commandments at Matthew 22.37-40—especially this last verse, “on these two commandments depend all the Law and the Prophets”*—then we believe that our treatment of Genesis is also swallowed up by the commandment to love our neighbor, and therefore we should conduct ourselves in love and never let our reading cause discord, undue argument, or strife. To this point Augustine rightly cites Paul at 1 Corinthians 4.6: “Let us not therefore be puffed up in favor of one, against another, above that which is written.”

*Bible citations so marked come from the English Standard Version.